The Informant

While announcing a statewide operation against the Nuestra Familia prison gang at the end of August, Attorney General (and gubernatorial candidate) Jerry Brown advocated cellphone jamming technology in California prison facilities to prevent inmates from communicating with the outside world.

According to the state Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, high-ranking members of NF incarcerated in the Secure Housing Unit at Pelican Bay State Prison were smuggling messages to their underlings in less secure units. In turn, they would disseminate their orders via cellphone, written messages or word of mouth to NF sets across the state.

As Rina reported last month, CDCR’s effort to restrict the ability of prison gangs to communicate also involved further restrictions on visits, mail and access to bank accounts. While cellphone jamming would require a change in federal law, prison officials at a minimum-security facility in Kern County have already banned physical contact between inmates and visits.

Regardless of the restrictions imposed on inmates, CDCR might want to take a closer look at its own staff. According to a January report by the National Gang Intelligence Center on gang infiltration of law enforcement, CDCR has a significant problem with gangs holding sway over certain prison guards, who smuggle in goods, give incarcerated gang members unwarranted privileges and conceal their activities.

For those seeking a quick summary, here’s the most relevant sentence to California prisons: “Dozens of CDCR employees in recent years have been investigated, dismissed, and arrested for their gang
associations or for assisting gang members, according to CDCR reporting.”

Some of the instances documented by CDCR include:

• Several years ago, Corcoran State Correctional Institution hired a
  former Hispanic gang member. Within five years, he became involved in gang
  activity and ultimately hired gang members to murder his wife.
• In 2002, a female correctional officer at Folsom State Prison was
  investigated after letters to her inmate husband, a Northern Structure [Nuestra Familia] gang leader,
  were intercepted. The letters revealed sensitive information about the correctional
  facility and staff.
• In approximately 2007, a correctional officer in Salinas Valley granted
  favors for gang members in his facility, such as opening cell block doors,
  and manipulating housing assignments.
• In 2009 a female CDCR employee provided confidential information,
  including the social security numbers of correctional officers, to her incarcerated
  husband, a Mexican Mafia member.
• In June 2006, a state correctional officer at the California Institution for Men in
  Chino, California was convicted on federal racketeering charges for helping the Nazi
  Low Riders white supremacist gang distribute drugs and assault other inmates.

It’s worth noting how many different institutions and gangs are cited in this report – this conduct is not limited to a certain facility or by the ethnicity of a gang.

In response to the report, CDCR spokesperson Terry Thornton emphasized the department’s “very, very thorough” background checks for applicants. However, in an agency with approximately 66,000 employees, Thornton said there will be instances where CDCR employees will succumb to pressure or temptation to work with gangs.

Such cases, including all those reported by CDCR to the National Gang Intelligence Center, are investigated by the department’s Internal Affairs unit. Employees found guilty of such misconduct could face termination and, if the offense is serious enough, criminal charges.